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INTRODUCTION 
On November 14, 2012, plaintiffs George Burke, Kristin 
Casper, and LMP Services, Inc., owners of the “Schnitzel King” and 
“Cupcakes for Courage” food trucks, filed suit against the City of 
Chicago.1 The suit alleged that the City’s ordinance regarding the 
regulation of mobile food vendors violated the Illinois Constitution, 
                                                            
* J.D. Northwestern University School of Law, 2015. 
1 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 1-3, Burke v. 
City of Chicago, No. 12-CH-41235 (Cook Co. Cir. filed Nov. 14, 2012), 2012 WL 
5513206. 




including due process guarantees and freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.2  
The plaintiffs allege that the restrictions placed on mobile food 
vending in Chicago’s municipal code make it virtually impossible to 
operate a food truck profitably.3 These restrictions include bans on the 
operation of mobile food vendors within “200 feet of any principal 
customer entrance to a restaurant which is located on the street 
level.”4 The ordinance contains numerous other restrictions on the 
operation of food trucks, including establishing zones where food 
trucks cannot operate,5 dictating food truck hours of operation,6 and 
limiting the types of kitchens in which mobile food vendors can 
prepare their foods.7   
The Illinois Constitution provides that, “No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be 
denied the equal protection of the laws.”8 The Illinois State Supreme 
Court has found that this Clause includes the right of state residents to 
engage in a lawful business when it does not threaten any public 
interest.9 In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the restriction on 
mobile food vending within 200 feet of a fixed food business prevents 
the plaintiffs from engaging in a lawful business pursuit.10 
Furthermore, they allege that the ordinance serves no legitimate 
public interest, but exists only to protect fixed businesses, such as 
restaurants, from having to compete with food trucks.11 The court has 
not dismissed the plaintiffs’ due process claim, nor has it addressed 
the wisdom or merit of the ordinance or the plaintiffs’ argument that 
                                                            
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7–38–115(f) (2012).  
5 Id. §  7–38–117(c). 
6 Id. § 7–38–115(b); § 7-38-115(d); § 7-38-115(f). 
7 Id. § 7–38–075(7)(b). 
8 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
9 See Scully v. Hallihan, 6 N.E.2d 176, 179-181 (Ill. 1936). 
10 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 15-18, Burke v. 
City of Chicago, No. 12-CH-41235 (Cook Co. Cir. filed Nov. 14, 2012), 2012 WL 
5513206. 
11 Id. at 19. 
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the ordinance largely exists to protect fixed restaurants from 
competition.12 
This Note reviews the current regulatory framework in the City 
of Chicago concerning mobile food vending. Part I analyzes the 
current ordinances regulating food trucks. The Note then compares 
Chicago’s mobile food vending regulations to those regulations in 
other American cities. Parts II and III argue the true purpose of some 
of the mobile food vending restrictions in Chicago is to protect 
restaurants from competition; Part III also shows that these 
restrictions have a significant negative impact on the Chicago mobile 
food vending industry. Part IV examines Illinois court cases that have 
analyzed mobile food vending and the right to a lawful profession. It 
also describes the rational basis framework which Illinois courts use 
in examining the legality of Chicago’s mobile food vending 
ordinances. Part V juxtaposes Chicago’s mobile food vending 
ordinances with these court decisions. This Note concludes that 
Chicago’s mobile food vending ordinances violate the Illinois 
Constitution. Parts VI and VII argue that many of the current 
regulations are not optimized to meet stated policy objectives, and 
make a case for other policies. Finally, this Note argues that 
protecting restaurants, an implicit objective of many of the mobile 
food vending regulations, is not a legitimate objective for 
policymakers.  
I. ORDINANCE 
 On June 27, 2012, Chicago’s City Council voted to implement 
Ordinance 02012-4489 (the Ordinance), entitled “Amendment of 
Titles 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, and 17 of Municipal Code regarding mobile food 
vehicles.”13 Prior to the vote, numerous groups called for reforms to 
                                                            
12 See Case Information Summary for Case Number 2012-CH-41235, COOK 
CNTY. CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, 
https://w3.courtlink.lexisnexis.com/cookcounty/Finddock.asp?DocketKey=CABC0
CH0EBCDF0CH (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
13 The changes to Municipal Code made by the Ordinance can be found online. 
See Amendment of Titles 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, and 17 of Municipal Code Regarding Mobile 




Chicago’s regulation of mobile food vendors in Internet editorials14 
and other forums.15 The Ordinance passed the City Council 44-1, with 
Alderman John Arena of Ward 45 being the sole vote against it.16  
The Ordinance dramatically changed the mobile food vending 
landscape in Chicago.17 The Ordinance permits the preparation of 
food on mobile vehicles, which had previously been banned due to 
alleged public health concerns.18 To assuage those public health 
concerns, the Ordinance imposes numerous requirements on mobile 
food vendors, including mandatory consultations with a member of 
the Department of Public Health19 and inspection by the Chicago 
Department of Public Health.20  
Despite the near-unanimous support among the Aldermen, the 
Ordinance has left some mobile food vendors and their supporters 
disappointed.21 The Ordinance lists zones in which food trucks cannot 
                                                                                                                                           
Food Vehicles, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, CITY OF CHICAGO, 
https://chicago.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1143317&GUID=36D8C88
9-ABEC-4474-8991-6BAA0B4085D5 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (follow 
“Attachments: SO2012-4489.pdf” hyperlink). 
14 E.g., Sharon Shi, Can We Cook Already?, FOOD TRUCK FREAK (Oct. 31, 
2011), http://foodtruckfreak.com/can-we-cook-already/. 
15 E.g., ERIN NORMAN ET AL., STREETS OF DREAMS: HOW CITIES CAN CREATE 
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY BY KNOCKING DOWN PROTECTIONIST BARRIERS TO 
STREET VENDING (2011), available at 
http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/atl_vending/streetsofdreams
_webfinal.pdf. 
16 Baylen Linnekin, Chicago’s Disgusting New Food Truck Regulations, 
REASON.COM (July 28, 2012), http://reason.com/archives/2012/07/28/chicagos-
disgusting-war-on-food-trucks. 
17 See Press Release, Mayor’s Press Office, Mayor Emanuel to Legalize Cook-
On-Site Food Truck Industry Across Chicago (June 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2012/j
une_2012/mayor_emanuel_tolegalizecook-on-
sitefoodtruckindustryacrosschica.html.   
18 Interview with John Arena, Alderman, Chicago Ward 45, in Chi., Ill., (Oct. 
23, 2013) (notes from interview on file with author). 
19 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7-38-075(b) (2012). 
20 Id. § 7-38-126. 
21 See e.g., Linnekin, supra note 16; Monica Eng & John Byrne, Revised Food 
Truck Ordinance Still Disappoints Advocates, CHI. TRIB. (July 18, 2012), 
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operate, including the Chicago Medical District, and empowers the 
City Council to create other non-mobile vending zones at their 
discretion.22 The Ordinance also details the operations of food trucks, 
including mandating that a truck cannot operate from a single space 
for more than two consecutive hours.23 The Ordinance also bars trucks 
from operating between 2:00 AM and 5:00 AM,24 a period in which 
many mobile food vendors in other cities achieve considerable 
success.25 Other parts of the Ordinance cover food safety and storage, 
including specifics regarding dairy and milk products,26 refrigeration 
standards,27 and inspections of mobile food operators.28 The 
Ordinance goes into tremendous detail about other aspects of food 
preparation and service, including what types of wrappers can be 
used29 and what type of utensils can be provided.30 
Of the restrictions placed on mobile food vendors, one of the 
most controversial has been the spatial limitations on mobile food 
vendor operations. These restrictions include bans on the operation of 
a food truck within twenty feet of a crosswalk, thirty feet of a stop 
light or stop sign, or next to a protected bike lane.31 Additional 
restrictions apply to mobile food vendors who wish to operate in 




22 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7-38-117(c) (2012). 
23 Id. § 7-38-115(b). 
24 Id. § 7-38-115(d).  
25 See, e.g., Carol Kuruvilla, Halal Guys Food Cart to Open Restaurant in East 
Village, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/life-
style/eats/halal-guys-food-cart-open-restaurant-east-village-article-1.1474330 
(discussing the “Halal Guys” who operate in New York City at the intersection of 
53rd Street and 6th Avenue from 11 AM to 4 AM and are “known for the long late-
night lines”). 
26 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7-38-095 (2012). 
27 Id. § 7-38-134(e)(7). 
28 Id. § 7-38-126. 
29 Id. § 7-38-105. 
30 Id. § 7-38-100.  
31 Id. § 7-38-115(e). 




private lots, including prohibiting mobile food vending in vacant lots 
or vacant buildings.32 
The restrictions also include the 200-foot rule, one of the 
clauses challenged in the suit filed by the Burke plaintiffs.33 The 200-
foot rule prohibits vending within 200 feet of a restaurant, defined as 
a  
 
[f]ixed location kept, used, maintained, advertised and 
held out to the public as a place where food and drink is 
prepared and served for public consumption. . . . [s]uch 
establishments include, but are not limited to, 
restaurants, coffee shops, cafeterias, dining rooms, 
eating houses, short order cafes, luncheonettes, grills, 
tearooms and sandwich shops.34  
 
This restriction includes convenience stores, such as a 7-11.35 The 
200-foot rule applies at all times except between 12:00 AM and 2:00 
AM.36 
The Ordinance does include measures to minimize some 
restrictions on mobile food vending. Among these, the Ordinance 
dictates that the City shall create stands where mobile food vendors 
may operate within 200 feet of a restaurant.37 It does not specify how 
many stands will be created in total, but that a minimum of five will 
be created in any community area with more than 300 restaurants.38 
These community areas include the Loop, Streeterville, Lakeview, 
                                                            
32 Id. § 7-38-115(k)(2)(i)–(ii). 
33 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 1-3, Burke v. 
City of Chicago, No. 12-CH-41235 (Cook Co. Cir. filed Nov. 14, 2012), 2012 WL 
5513206. 
34 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7-38-115(f).  
35 Sweet Home Chicago? Food Trucks Get the Cold Shoulder in the Windy City, 
INST. FOR JUSTICE, https://www.ij.org/chicagofoodtrucks-background (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2014). 
36 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7-38-115(a) 
37 Id. at § 7-38-117(c). 
38 Id.  
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West Town, Wicker Park, and Lincoln Park.39 At these stands, mobile 
food vendors will be able to cook and serve food in close proximity to 
brick and mortar restaurants.40 One of the stated purposes of the 
stands is to permit the cooking and vending of food by mobile food 
vendors; the Ordinance includes provisions related to traffic 
congestion and waste to fixed locations so the City can monitor 
them.41 
The Ordinance prohibits the operation of a mobile food vendor 
in a single space for more than two hours, which also applies to the 
stands.42 The Ordinance, however, does permit the Commissioner of 
the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection to allow 
the use of mobile food vending stands between 2:00 A.M. and 5:00 
A.M., contrary to other restrictions on mobile food vending.43 Thus 
far, the City has announced the location of numerous food stands. 
These stands largely exist in the commercially dense community areas 
listed above, but many of the stands are on side streets or far from 
commercial centers.44 
The Ordinance is one of the most restrictive regulations of 
mobile food vendors among large American cities.45 Of the fifty 
largest cities in the country, twenty have mobile food vending 
                                                            




41 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Complaint, Burke v. City of Chicago, No. 12-CH-41235, at 7 (Cook Co. Cir. filed 
Nov. 14, 2012) (Defendant’s motion to dismiss was filed April 12, 2013).  
42 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7-38-115(b) (2012). 
43 Id. at § 7-38-115(d). 
44 See Phil Vettel, Chicago Announces Food-Truck Parking-Spot Locations, 
CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 3, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-10-03/news/chi-
chicago-announces-foodtruck-parking-locations-20121003_1_food-trucks-mobile-
food-vehicles-locations; CITY OF CHI. SMALL BUS. CTR., MOBILE FOOD TRUCK 
STANDS MAP (Apr. 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/bacp/general/Mobile_Food_Tr
uck_Stands_Map-V.04.15.14.pdf. 
45 See NORMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 17-25. 




proximity restrictions in place similar to the one in Chicago.46 
However, among America’s ten largest cities, only Chicago and San 
Antonio have proximity restrictions on mobile food vending.47 New 
York, Los Angeles, Houston, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Dallas, Boston, 
and San Diego all regulate food trucks without using a proximity 
restriction.48 Prior to the adoption of the Ordinance, which permits on-
board cooking previously prohibited,49 Chicago arguably had the most 
stringent mobile food vending regulations of any large city in the 
United States.50 
In comparison to the cities of New York and Los Angeles, 
Chicago imposes substantially more burdensome regulations on 
mobile food vendors.51 In addition to health and safety regulations, 
New York City has some restrictions on mobile food vendors, 
including requiring vendors to apply for a restricted area permit to 
operate their mobile food vendors from private property.52 However, 
unlike Chicago, New York City has no public property vending bans, 
nor proximity bans (like the 200-foot rule).53 Furthermore, New York 
has no durational restrictions, unlike Chicago,54 where vendors cannot 
sell from a fixed location for over two hours. As a result, nearly 5,000 
mobile food vendors legally operate in New York City.55 
Regulations regarding mobile food vendors are substantially 
less stringent in Los Angeles than in Chicago. Los Angeles does not 
                                                            
46 Id. at 4.  
47 Id. at 18. 
48 See id. at 16. 
49 Monica Eng, First Chicago Food Truck Gets Onboard Cooking License, CHI. 
TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-31/features/chi-
first-chicago-food-truck-gets-onboard-cooking-license-20130131_1_mobile-food-
preparer-food-truck-brick-and-mortar-restaurant. 
50 See NORMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 15-23. 
51 See id.  
52 Street Vending, NYC BUS. SOLUTIONS, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/sbs/nycbiz/downloads/pdf/educational/sector_guides/stree
t_vending.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
53 NORMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 16. 
54 Id. at 23. 
55 See Street Vending, supra note 52. 
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regulate mobile food vendors with either proximity or durational 
restrictions.56 While Los Angeles bans the operation of food trucks on 
public property and creates restricted areas in the City in which food 
trucks cannot operate,57 these restrictions are far less burdensome than 
those in Chicago. The lack of proximity restrictions means mobile 
food vendors in Los Angeles can operate in high restaurant-density 
areas such as Downtown Los Angeles. As a result of the lax 
restrictions, Los Angeles County has more than 6,000 food trucks.58 
II. THE ORDINANCE’S PROTECTIONIST PURPOSE 
Aspects of Chicago’s mobile food vending regulations, 
including those not found in most other large American cities, appear 
to have been implemented to protect other industries from competing 
with mobile food vendors. Unlike other restrictions on mobile food 
vending, which logically serve the interests of maintaining public 
health, preventing crime, and reducing noise and congestion, the 200-
foot rule fails to serve any interest other than preventing mobile food 
vendors from operating near restaurants. Throughout the legislative 
process, various Chicago aldermen and restaurateurs have justified 
stringent restrictions on food trucks as necessary to protect brick-and-
mortar restaurants. 
Alderman Proco Moreno, who along with Alderman Tom 
Tunney introduced the Ordinance, stated the reason for the 200-foot 
rule was to balance competing interests, as “[y]ou want to not infringe 
on the brick-and-mortars but not to interfere with entrepreneurship.”59 
This suggests the Ordinance’s true purpose was protecting restaurants, 
particularly in commercially dense parts of the City. Together, the 
                                                            
56 NORMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 16. 
57 Id. at 17-18.  
58 Best Food Trucks in America 2012, FOX NEWS (Nov. 23, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/leisure/2012/11/20/best-food-trucks-in-america-2012/. 








two aldermen received nearly $50,000 in campaign contributions and 
ward funding from trade groups supporting the City’s restaurants and 
merchants.60 In an opinion article Alderman Moreno wrote for the 
Huffington Post, the Alderman argued that while Ordinance 02012-
4490 may seem complex, its reforms were needed to “ensure public 
safety, dispel the competitive concerns of established businesses and 
help the food truck industry grow.”61 Other aldermen, in support of 
the Ordinance, have made statements that suggest a similar 
protectionist purpose.62 For example, Alderman Brendan Reilly 
argued in favor of the Ordinance to “[i]magine parking a slider truck 
in front of Epic Burger. . . I’m trying to strike a very careful 
balance.”63    
In addition to aldermen, restaurateurs similarly suggested the 
Ordinance has a protectionist purpose.64 Glen Keefer, owner of 
restaurants “Keefer’s” and “Keefer’s Kaffe,” stated at a City Council 
meeting that restaurants “carry the tax burden, so we do deserve a 
little protection from other businesses and people parking in front of 
businesses and siphoning off our customers.”65 In an opinion article 
published in Crain’s Chicago Business, Keefer wrote:  
                                                            
60 Chicago Food Trucks Stalling, Running Out of Gas, NACS (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://www.nacsonline.com/News/Daily/Pages/ND0119125.aspx#.VQCz5ULkMg
M. 
61 Joe Moreno, Responsible and Realistic Restaurants-on-Wheels: The New 
Food Truck Ordinance, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2012, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-moreno/responsible-and-
realistic_b_1643989.html. 
62 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, supra note 1, 
at 11-12. 
63 Ted Cox, More Food Trucks But Still No Licenses to Cook Onboard, 
DNAINFO (Jan. 25, 2013, 8:24 AM), 
http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20130125/chicago/food-trucks-rise-despite-city-
ordinance. 
64 See Monica Eng, Mobile Food Ordinance Rolls Through City Council 
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We must find a way to prevent unscrupulous truck 
operators from parking in front of the highest-priced 
real estate in the city to siphon off customers headed to 
businesses paying property taxes, rent and fees for 
signs, loading zones, [and] building permits. Some hail 
the renegade truck as the ideal form of 
entrepreneurship, the ultimate shoestring startup. 
That’s not superior business acumen and grit; that’s 
piracy.66 
Jay Stieber, Executive Vice President of Lettuce Entertain You 
Enterprises, joined Keefer in supporting the Ordinance.67 Stieber 
stated that it “is essential to maintain . . . the 200ft rule that is being 
promulgated to protect the bricks and mortar restaurants.”68 
Of the forty-five aldermen who voted on the Ordinance, 
Alderman Arena was the only dissenting vote. In justifying his vote, 
Alderman Arena stated that the Ordinance served a protectionist 
purpose and had been “stuffed with protectionism and baked in an 
oven of paranoia.”69 In a phone interview, Alderman Arena described 
how his own interest in the issue began when a food truck wished to 
operate in the parking lot of a business within a food-underserved 
neighborhood in his ward and was unable to do so because of mobile 
food vending regulations.70 
                                                            
66 Glen Keefer, Chicago Deserves Better Rules on Food Trucks, CRAIN’S CHI. 
BUS. (May 10, 2012), 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120510/NEWS07/120509756/chicago-
deserves-better-rules-on-food-trucks.  
67 Alex Levine, Summary of the Public Food Truck Hearing at City Hall, FOOD 
TRUCK FREAK (Aug. 7, 2012), http://foodtruckfreak.com/summary-of-the-public-
food-truck-hearing-at-city-hall/.  
68 Id. 
69 Ted Cox, Chicago Food Trucks to Have Day in Court Over ‘Anti-
Competitive Laws’, DNAINFO (June 12, 2013, 4:18 PM), 
http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20130612/chicago/chicago-food-trucks-have-day-
court-over-anti-competitive-laws.  
70 Interview with John Arena, supra note 18.  




Alderman Arena went on to describe the heavy lobbyist 
influence exerted by restaurants, including by different members of 
the Illinois Restaurant Association.71 He described committee 
meetings as having a less than professional atmosphere, including 
Michael Keefer describing the anatomical implications of not having 
bathrooms on food trucks.72 When asked why the Ordinance included 
certain provisions such as the 200-foot rule, Alderman Arena replied 
that the Ordinance was “allowed to basically be written by the Illinois 
Restaurant Association, to basically restrict entrepreneurial businesses 
in this way.”73 
When asked how he had become involved with mobile food 
vending politics, the Alderman described his own ward, located in the 
far northwestern corner of the City, which has limited access to many 
restaurants and eateries.74 When a neighborhood bar wanted to host a 
food truck in its parking lot, it found it impossible to do so legally due 
to the 200-foot rule.75  
Alderman Arena stated that he believed the reason he was the 
sole dissenting vote against the Ordinance was because most 
aldermen were not meaningfully impacted by it.76 Most wards in 
Chicago are neither particularly restaurant-dense nor attractive to food 
trucks. Alderman Arena also stated that many aldermen representing 
such districts voted for the Ordinance in the hopes that brick and 
mortar restaurants might move into their wards.77  
This logic, however, is not entirely persuasive. One might 
expect that in wards with few restaurants but substantial numbers of 
consumers, aldermen would be more attuned to the interests of 
consumers rather than restaurateurs. Thus, one might expect that 
aldermen would oppose food truck regulations. Alderman Arena’s 
behavior, in promoting the best interests of his own district with many 
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consumers and few restaurants, can be viewed this way. Thus, it 
remains unclear why the Ordinance enjoyed near unanimous support 
among City aldermen. 
One possible explanation is that the small size and nascent 
nature of Chicago’s mobile food vending industry lack the necessary 
political clout to compete with established brick and mortar 
restaurants. For example, in New York City, where thousands of 
mobile food vendors legally operate, mobile vendors have been active 
and effective in shaping ordinances regulating mobile food vending.78 
Perhaps the interests of Chicago mobile food vendors were ignored 
during the drafting of City ordinances because there are few mobile 
food vendors in Chicago. However, this is largely due to the 
restrictive nature of City ordinances, creating a cycle of political 
powerlessness. Thus, dispersed interests, such as those of consumers, 
may need to voice support for mobile food vendors for City policy to 
change and create an environment in which mobile food vendors can 
thrive.79  
                                                            
78 See Alissa Fleck, NYC Food Carts: Behind the Scenes of New Regulations, 
STRAUS MEDIA (Feb. 17, 2015), http://nypress.com/nyc-food-carts-behind-the-
scenes-of-new-regulations/. 
79 The balance in policymaking and political power between small groups with 
concentrated benefits and large groups with diffuse costs is fundamental to political 
and public choice theory.  
Economists call this the problem of concentrated benefits and 
diffuse costs. The benefits of any government program—
Medicare, teachers’ pensions, a new highway, a tariff—are 
concentrated on a relatively small number of people. But the costs 
are diffused over millions of consumers or taxpayers. So the 
beneficiaries, who stand to gain a great deal from a new program 
or lose a great deal from the elimination of a program, have a 
strong incentive to monitor the news, write their legislator, make 
political contributions, attend town halls, and otherwise work to 
protect the program. But each taxpayer, who pays little for each 
program, has much less incentive to get involved in the political 
process or even to vote. 
David Boaz, Well Worth the Money, CATO INST. (Aug. 22, 2011), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/well-worth-money. 




Some supporters of the Ordinance and the 200-foot rule cite 
reasons other than protectionism in their support of the law.80 For 
example, Sam Toia, President of the Illinois Restaurant Association 
and a supporter of the Ordinance, stated that the aim of the 200-foot 
rule was “easing traffic congestion and ensuring access for emergency 
and police vehicles and garbage removal.”81 Despite a few comments 
similar to Toia’s, the overwhelming majority of statements indicate 
protectionist purposes, as described above. 
III. IMPACT OF THE ORDINANCE 
The 200-foot rule significantly affected mobile food vendors 
and their capacity to compete in the City. Nationwide, lunch provides 
a significant revenue-grossing period for mobile food vendors.82 For 
mobile food vendors who serve a lunch crowd, clustering in 
concentrated commercial areas can be an effective business practice.83 
In Chicago, this would include the Loop neighborhood. The 200-foot 
rule, which essentially prevents any mobile food vending in the Loop 
outside of designated stands, thus cuts off a significant source of 
revenue for mobile food vendors. A map of the areas in the Loop in 
which mobile food vending is prohibited can be seen in the image 
below:84 
                                                            
80 E.g., Monica Eng, Food Truck Ordinance Savory to Some, Sour to Others, 
CHI. TRIB. (July 9, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-09/news/ct-
met-food-truck-followup-20120709_1_food-truck-truck-operators-fines. 
81 Id. 
82 See Alan Philips, What You Need to Know About Starting a Food Truck 
Business, IDIOT’S GUIDE, 
http://idiotsguides.com/static/quickguides/businesspersonalfinance/what-you-need-
to-know-about-starting-a-food-truck-business.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
83 Id.  
84 Alex Levine, Debunking and Contextualizing Claims About Proposed 
Chicago Food Truck Ordinance Amendments, FOOD TRUCK FREAK (July 16, 2012), 
http://foodtruckfreak.com/debunking-contextualizing-claims-about-proposed-
chicago-food-truck-ordinance-amendments/. 




This image depicts the majority of Chicago’s Loop, its central 
business district, as well as parts of the commercially dense West 
Loop neighborhood.85 The impact of the restriction may be greatest in 
the Loop, but mobile food vending in other commercially dense areas 
in Chicago is similarly restricted. In many cities mobile food vendors 
concentrate in commercially dense neighborhoods to earn a profit,86 
which Chicago largely limits due to the 200-foot rule. 
IV. DUE PROCESS IN ILLINOIS 
                                                            
85 Id. 
86 See Philips, supra note 82. 




The suit brought by the Burke plaintiffs challenges the legality 
of the restrictions imposed by the Ordinance.87 Article I, section 2 of 
the Illinois Constitution guarantees due process and equal protection, 
providing that, “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law nor be denied the equal 
protection of the laws.”88 Various Illinois courts have examined both 
mobile food vending regulations and spatial competition restrictions 
in light of the Illinois Constitution, finding that it requires laws and 
municipal ordinances to be rationally related to a public goal. While 
courts grant broad leeway to municipalities in designing these laws, 
courts have also shown that they are willing to strike them down 
when they serve no interest other than the protection of entrenched 
interests or industries.   
Illinois courts have held that due process rights include the right 
to engage in lawful professional pursuits. A right to work recognition 
in Illinois dates back to the 1892 Illinois Supreme Court decision in 
Frorer v. People.89 The court stated, “the manufacture of cloth is an 
important industry, essential to the welfare of the community. There 
is no reason . . . why men should not be permitted to engage in it as a 
legitimate business, into which anybody may freely enter.”90 In 
deriving a right to work, the court drew heavily from a West Virginia 
Supreme Court case, State v. Goodwill. 91 The court, quoting 
Goodwill, stated, “the patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength 
and dexterity of his own hands; and to hinder him from employing 
these in what manner he may think proper, without injury to his 
neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property.”92 This 
decision and language is consistent with other early court decisions 
concerning due process.93 
                                                            
87 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, supra note 1, at 
1–2. 
88 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
89 31 N.E. 395 (Ill. 1892).    
90 Id. at 398–99. 
91 State v. Goodwill, 10 S.E. 285 (W. Va. 1889). 
92 Id. at 287. 
93 See, e.g., Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454 (Ill. 1895). 
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Despite the Due Process protections for employment and work, 
Illinois courts have held that there are circumstances in which the 
state can regulate or restrict otherwise legal employment. The Tenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides, “[t]he 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”94 This has been found to include the power to “enact 
measures to preserve and protect the safety, health, welfare, and 
morals of the community.”95 In aggregate, this power is frequently 
referred to as the police power. Regulating food trucks and 
restaurants, which are clearly related to public health and safety, is 
uncontestably within the purview of Illinois and Chicago’s police 
power. Furthermore, it is well established that regulating the use of 
public streets is within the state’s police power domain as well.96 
Nonetheless, Illinois courts have found that this exercise of the police 
power must be reasonable in its application.97  
Under substantive due process in Illinois, if a statute does not 
affect a fundamental constitutional right, it is analyzed under the 
rational basis test.98 The regulation of mobile food vendors and food 
trucks, as an economic issue, would be considered under a rational 
basis review. Courts have found the test to be satisfied when “the 
challenged statute bears a rational relationship to the purpose the 
                                                            
94 U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
95 Police Powers, US LEGAL, http://municipal.uslegal.com/police-powers/ (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
96 See, e.g., Good Humor Corp. v. Vill. of Mundelein, 211 N.E.2d 269, 272-73 
(Ill. 1965) (holding that ice cream trucks had no property rights in the use of streets, 
and that an ordinance prohibiting the selling of ice cream was constitutional); Olsen 
v. City of Chicago, 184 N.E.2d 879, 880-81 (Ill. 1962) (holding that a law 
regulating and limiting the circumstances under which taxi drivers could accept 
fares was constitutional); City of Decatur v. Chasteen, 166 N.E.2d 29, 34-35 (Ill. 
1960) (upholding a law banning operating taxis along a fixed route).   
97 Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin, 265 N.E.2d 640, 642 (Ill. 1970) (“To be a 
valid exercise of the police power, the enactment of the legislature must bear a 
reasonable relation to the public interest sought to be protected, and the means 
adopted must be a reasonable method to accomplish such an objective.”). 
98 People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 304 (Ill. 2004). 




legislature intended to achieve in enacting the statute.”99 Under the 
test, a court does not attempt to analyze the “wisdom of the statute or 
with whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result,”100 but 
instead upholds the law “[s]o long as there is a conceivable basis for 
finding the statute rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”101 
However, when there has been no plausible justification for a law or 
ordinance other than protectionism, the Illinois Supreme Court has 
frequently struck down laws as violating the rational basis test.102 
Banghart v. Walsh represents an example of a case in which the 
Illinois Supreme Court struck down such a protectionist statute. In 
that case, the plaintiffs challenged a law regulating barbers and beauty 
culturists that restricted the licensing of individuals in these fields and 
the number of new permits distributed.103 The Court found against the 
state, holding that:  
When the police power is exerted to regulate the 
conduct of a useful business or occupation, the 
Legislature is not the sole judge of what is a reasonable 
and just restraint upon the constitutional right of the 
citizen to pursue his calling and exercise his own 
judgment as to the manner of conducting it, but the 
measures adopted to protect the public health and 
                                                            
99 Id.  
100 Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 810 N.E.2d 13, 26 (Ill. 2004). 
101 Id. 
102 See, e.g., Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580 (Ill. 1995) (holding a law 
unconstitutional that granted an irrational monopoly); People v. Johnson, 369 
N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ill. 1977) (holding a law that required an apprenticeship period 
before anyone could be licensed as a plumber to be unconstitutional); People v. 
Masters, 274 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. 1971) (holding that a law requiring someone to post 
a large bond and pay a licensing fee to become a plumber was unconstitutional); 
Suburban Ready-Mix Corp. v. Vill. of Wheeling, 185 N.E.2d 665, 666-67 (Ill. 
1962) (holding a law that denied a certain type of manufacturing plant in an 
industrial district created a monopoly and was unconstitutional).  
103 Banghart v. Walsh, 171 N.E. 154, 155-56 (Ill. 1930). 
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secure the public safety and welfare must have some 
relation to these proposed ends.104  
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated, “the 
power of the legislature to thus limit the right to contract must rest 
upon some reasonable basis, and cannot be arbitrarily exercised.”105 
The Court would later elaborate, “[a]n act which deprives a citizen of 
his liberty or property rights cannot be sustained under the police 
power unless a due regard for the public health, safety, comfort or 
welfare requires it.”106 
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Lombard is an Illinois 
Supreme Court case that closely resembles the action filed in regards 
to Chicago’s mobile food vending ordinance. Chicago Title & Trust 
analyzed an ordinance, similar to the Ordiance at issue in Burke, 
regulating spatial limitation on competition within an industry.107  A 
local ordinance banned the opening of gasoline filling stations within 
650 feet of an existing station.108 The Village of Lombard claimed that 
the ordinance was a legitimate exercise of state police power, as it 
was enacted to further the legitimate ends of public safety and fire 
prevention.109 The plaintiffs, who wished to open a petroleum filling 
station within 650 feet of an existing station, claimed there was no 
relationship between distances between filling stations and fire risk.110 
Experts in the case testified that there was virtually no fire 
contamination risk between two stations.111  
The court acknowledged that the regulation of filling stations, 
which affected public health and safety, was clearly under the 
                                                            
104 Id. at 156. 
 
105 Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 456 (Ill. 1895). 
106 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Lombard, 166 N.E.2d 41, 45 (Ill. 
1960). 
107 Id. at 42-43. 
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 43-44. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 45. 




purview of the state police power.112 Filling stations posed a potential 
fire risk and produced fumes that could be hazardous.113 The Court 
noted that such ordinances were valid if “they bear a sufficient 
relationship to the promotion of public health and safety.”114 The court 
also made clear that ordinances not generalized in their application 
are invalid, since if an ordinance is “not general in character, or if it 
does not operate equally upon all persons of the same class within the 
municipality, it cannot be sustained.”115 
In striking down the ordinance, the Court found the 650-foot 
rule bore an insufficient relationship to the promotion of public 
safety.116 The Village of the Lombard filling station ordinance also 
prevented filling stations from operating within 150 feet of churches, 
hospitals, and schools, places where many individuals congregate and 
where a fire hazard would be particularly acute.117 The Court noted 
that if the true purpose of the ordinance was public health, it was 
unreasonable to impose a 650-foot restriction on two filling stations, 
and only a 150-foot restriction between filling stations and places of 
public gathering.118 
                                                            
112 Id. at 46 (“It is not disputed that the village may impose requirements on 
filling stations in addition to zoning restrictions. It has power to regulate the manner 
in which a permitted use is carried on, the way in which buildings are erected or 
maintained, and the like.”). 
113 Id. at 44. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 45. 
116 Id. at 46. 
117 Id. at 44-45. 
118 Id.  
Under section 17 of the Lombard filling station ordinance, filling 
stations are prohibited within 150 feet of any hospital, church or 
school; and it can hardly be supposed that proximity to such 
places, where numbers of people are accustomed to assemble, 
involves less danger than proximity to another filling station. To 
require filling stations to be separated by at least 650 feet, while 
requiring an intervening distance of only 150 feet between a 
filling station and a hospital, church or school, is clearly 
unreasonable if the test is danger to the public. 
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One of the few Illinois Supreme Court cases to deal specifically 
with the issue of mobile food vending is Triple A Services, Inc. v. 
Rice.119 In this case Thunderbird Catering and Triple A Services, Inc. 
filed a complaint to enjoin an ordinance imposing a ban on street 
vendors in the Chicago Medical Center District.120 Both companies 
were mobile food vendors that sold food in the Chicago Medical 
Center District.121 In 1984, Chicago enacted an ordinance banning 
mobile food vending within the Medical Center District,122 a 
prohibition that remains to this day.123 The City claimed the ban was 
created to prevent traffic congestion within the area, which was 
necessary to ensure adequate access to hospitals by emergency service 
vehicles.124 The plaintiffs brought in expert testimony that the Medical 
District had relatively low traffic and the ban on mobile food vending 
actually increased traffic as workers were forced to leave the area to 
purchase food.125 Furthermore, expert witnesses testified that mobile 
food vendors had “no measurable impact upon the flow of traffic or 
upon health and sanitation considerations in the District.”126    
                                                                                                                                           
Id. 
119 528 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), rev'd, 545 N.E.2d 706 (Ill. 1989). 
120 Id. at 268. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. The ordinance stated, in relevant part: 
No person shall conduct the business of a Mobile Food Dispenser 
or Peddler, as defined in this code, on any portion of the public 
way within the boundaries of the Medical Center District, to wit: 
Ashland Avenue on the east, Congress Parkway on the north, 
Western Avenue on the west, and a line co-incidental with the 
north line of the property at or near 14th Street and 15th Street 
owned or used by the Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal 
Railroad Company for railroad purposes, on the south. 
Id. (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 27-269.1 (1984)).  
123 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 9–80–190 (2012) (“Mobile food vendors 
and peddlers prohibited in medical center district.”). 
124 Triple A Servs., 528 N.E.2d at 271.  
125 Id. at 269. 
126 Id. at 269-70. 




In overturning the relevant ordinance, the Illinois appellate 
court found the ordinance unreasonable, including its overbroad ban 
on mobile food vending.127 The court also found that even if some 
restrictions were needed to ensure traffic access, the City failed to 
show that a 24 hours per day, 7 days per week ban was necessary to 
accomplish this purpose.128 
Eleven months later, the Supreme Court of Illinois overturned 
the appellate court’s decision.129 The Illinois Supreme Court noted 
that an ordinance need only be rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest to be valid.130 Furthermore, the court relied on 
Illinois case law, which requires plaintiffs challenging an ordinance as 
not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose to show the 
ordinance is “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable municipal 
action.” 131 
In overturning the lower court, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
found the ordinance rationally related to the goal of enhancing the 
Medical District.132 Furthermore, it rejected that the prohibition of sale 
24 hours a day, 7 days a week was so overly broad as to be 
arbitrary.133 Noting “the fit between the means and the end to be 
achieved need not be perfect,” the court rejected the argument that the 
statute needed to conform with scientific or accurate data.134 The 
Court further asserted that traffic in the Medical District could 
rationally hinder public health at all times.135 
                                                            
127 Id. at 277-78. 
128 Id. at 280-82 (finding no rational basis on which to ban food trucks, 
including that no studies on food trucks and congestion had been conducted by the 
City). 
129 See Triple A Servs., Inc. v. Rice,  545 N.E.2d 706, 714-15 (Ill. 1989). 
130 Id. at 709 (“It is well established that unless an act impinges on a 
fundamental personal right or is drawn upon an inherently suspect classification, it 
is presumptively valid, and it will survive constitutional scrutiny if it is rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
131 Id. (quoting City of Decatur v. Chasteen, 166 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. 1960)). 
132 Id. at 714. 
133 Id. at 712. 
134 Id. at 710. 
135 Id. at 710-714; see also Vaden v. Village of Maywood, Ill., 809 F.2d 361, 
363 (7th Cir. 1987) (reviewing plaintiff’s claim regarding an ordinance banning the 
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V. APPLICATION OF CASE LAW TO CHICAGO’S FOOD ORDINANCE 
 Nationally, state and federal courts remain deeply skeptical of 
proximity-based restrictions for the operation of the same type of 
business.136 The Ordinance is only valid under the Illinois 
Constitution if its restrictions are rationally related to legitimate 
public ends. There is reason to be skeptical that the Ordinance passes 
this test. Chicago’s stated public goals for the Ordinance are the 
promotion of public health, traffic congestion, and safety, which are 
all within the purview of the state’s police power. As shown in 
Chicago Title & Trust, protectionism by itself is not a valid exercise 
                                                                                                                                           
operation of mobile food vendors near a school from 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM during 
the months of June and July). The Vaden Court stated: 
The Village's disparate treatment of food vendors apparently 
reflects the Village's determination that because mobile food 
dispenser vehicles are allowed to travel the public streets of the 
Village in search of customers, they are more likely to attract and 
delay school children and to cause disturbances in residential 
areas. This determination is entirely rational. The distinctions 
between street vendors and merchants with a fixed place of 
business have been accepted by other courts in upholding similar 
ordinances against equal protection challenges. 
Id. at 365-66. 
136 E.g., Mister Softee v. Mayor & City Council of Hoboken, 186 A.2d 513, 519 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1962) (“Regulation of a business is not objectionable 
because similar restrictions are not placed on other businesses. The discrimination 
that gives rise to relief exists only where persons engaged in the same business are 
subjected to different restrictions, or are extended different privileges under the 
same conditions.”), overruled on other grounds by Brown v. City of Newark, 552 
A.2d 125, 132 (N.J. 1989); People v. Ala Carte Catering Corp., 159 Cal. Rptr. 479, 
485 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1979) (“Like the trial court, we conclude that 
section 80.73(b) 2A(2)(bb) is a ‘rather naked restraint of trade,’ and determine that 
it is ‘ . . . arbitrarily made for the mere purpose of classification, . . . (and not) based 
upon (a) distinction, natural, intrinsic or constitutional, which suggests a reason for, 
and justifies, the particular legislation.’”); Duchein v. Lindsay, 345 N.Y.S.2d 53,55-
58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), aff’d, 311 N.E.2d 508 (N.Y. 1974) (striking down a law 
which prevented operating a mobile vendor within a certain proximity of certain 
businesses).    




of a police power.137 For the ordinance to be constitutional, it would 
need to rationally serve some other goal such as reducing congestion 
or protecting public health. 
The prevention of traffic congestion is a constitutional goal, and 
a city ordinance that entirely banned food trucks for this purpose 
would probably be valid under the Illinois Constitution.138 A law or 
ordinance that restricts the operations of food trucks need not be 
optimal in achieving that end, but it must at least be rationally related 
to that goal. 
However, the 200-foot restriction on the operation of mobile 
food vendors does not appear to be rationally related to traffic 
congestion. A specific ban on the operation of food trucks in high 
traffic areas (such as the Loop, where under the Ordinance food 
trucks are effectively banned)139 or in areas where traffic congestion 
represents a substantial social ill (such as the Medical District) would 
appear to satisfy the rational basis test. However, there is no reason to 
believe that the existence of a brick-and-mortar restaurant or food 
vendor is materially related to congestion. 
As noted above, the Ordinance does create mobile food vending 
stands in community areas with a high concentration of restaurants.140 
The Ordinance dictates that the stands will be placed in areas where 
they do not impede traffic flow and are to the benefit of the public. In 
the Defendant’s motion to dismiss in Burke, the City argues that a 
mobile food vending stand might create less congestion than an 
otherwise-operating mobile food vendor as “congestion and litter 
trouble that may arise has a consistent location, which makes it easier 
to police and correct the problem in a way tailored to the site.”141  
                                                            
137 This rule appears to be limited to Illinois jurisprudence. See New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304-06 (1976) (holding that the City of New Orleans could 
reasonably conclude that street vendors would negatively affect a local restaurant 
monopoly, and that this represented a legitimate government end). 
138 Triple A Servs., Inc. v. Rice, 545 N.E.2d 706, 710-15 (Ill. 1989).  
139 Levine, supra note 84. 
140 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7–38–117(c) (2012). 
141 Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Complaint, supra note 41, at 8.   
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A blanket ban on the operation of food trucks within 200 feet of 
a brick-and-mortar restaurant or fixed food vendor does not appear 
even obliquely related to congestion. The reasoning in Chicago Title 
& Trust, which held that it was entirely irrational to prohibit the 
operation of filling stations within 650 feet of other filling stations, 
but only within 150 feet of areas where many people congregated, if 
the purpose was fire-risk prevention, may serve as a guide in viewing 
the reasonableness of the Ordinance.142 The Ordinance prohibits 
mobile food vendors from operating within twenty feet of a cross 
walk, thirty feet of a stop sign or stop light, or next to a protected bike 
lane.143 All three restrictions are rationally related to reducing 
congestion; parking near a stop sign, stop light, or cross walk could 
increase delays in areas which are frequently highly congested. 
Parking adjacent to a bike lane potentially endangers cyclists and 
deters cycling, an activity that reduces congestion. The Ordinance 
requires mobile food vendors to operate farther from a restaurant than 
from a stoplight, cross walk, or bike lane. This is an irrational way to 
minimize congestion. 
 Furthermore, the creation of fixed stands where mobile food 
vendors may operate is dubiously related to congestion. The creation 
of the stands in some of the most congested parts of the City suggests 
that the purpose of the Ordinance is not primarily to alleviate 
congestion. Rather, the stands appear to be a way for the City to 
deflect criticism that the Ordinance essentially bans all mobile food 
vending from areas with many restaurants, including most of the 
downtown area.144 
                                                            
142 See supra Part V (discussing Chicago Title & Trust). 
143 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7–38–115(e) (2012). 
144 The City argues that an ordinance is not doomed if it is seemingly 
contradictory to its stated purpose. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at 7. The City relies 
upon Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 321 N.E.2d 293, 303 (Ill. 
App.1974), as an example in which seemingly contradictory laws were held 
rational, quoting that a city need not apply a rule to “all cases which it might 
possibly reach.” The City also uses Petition of K.J.R., 687 N.E.2d 113, 123 (Ill. 
App. 1997), arguing the city “need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial 




 The City argues in response that stands are more easily 
monitored than mobile food vendors that travel to different locations. 
Furthermore, the City argues that as Chicago has historically had few 
food trucks and many fixed restaurants, “the City has had decades to 
figure out how to handle congestion and litter caused by fixed 
businesses, the new proliferation of food trucks brings new 
challenges, and the City has great latitude” to approach them in a 
piecemeal fashion.”145 This argument, however, does not satisfy the 
test that the ordinance be rationally related to its goal of reducing 
congestion. Regardless of whether stands are related to reducing 
congestion, the 200-foot rule does not appear to have any rational 
relationship to congestion relief. 
 In addition to congestion reduction, another potential rationale 
under the police power for a mobile food truck ban is public health 
concerns. Chicago has a clear interest in ensuring that vendors of 
foods maintain a quality standard that ensures the health and safety of 
its residents. Prior to the passage of the Ordinance, Chicago’s 
prohibition of the preparation of food on mobile food trucks 
represented a rational, if not optimal, legislative response intended to 
prevent the outbreak of disease and ensure food safety.  
Furthermore, if the City chose to ban all mobile food vendors, 
citing poor onboard sanitation or the lack of available restrooms for 
workers or clientele, the Ordinance would likely be rationally related 
to promoting public health. Indeed, the Ordinance contains numerous 
clauses dealing specifically with food safety, including those that 
limit the material the vehicle may be constructed out of,146 
refrigeration standards,147 the serving of milk products, food storage, 
and inspections of mobile food operators.148 The restriction on the 
operation of mobile food vendors within 200 feet of a fixed food 
                                                                                                                                           
scheme simply because it failed, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every 
evil that might conceivably have been attacked.” Id. at 123. 
145 Id. at 8.  
146 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7–38–095 (2012). 
147 Id. § 7-38-134(e)(7). 
148 Id. § 7-38-126. 
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seller, however, appears even less remotely related to public health 
than it is to congestion.  
There is no reason to believe that health risks related to mobile 
food vendors would be elevated if they operated in close proximity to 
a fixed restaurant.149 Further, the City has not presented evidence 
indicating that food contamination is more likely in food truck 
operations. This is akin to the lack of evidence concerning cross 
contamination of filling stations in Chicago Title & Trust.150 
Furthermore, arguments related to restroom access151 do not appear 
materially related to the proximity a mobile food vendor has to a fixed 
restaurant.  
Because the Ordinance is not rationally related to either the aim 
of reducing congestion or promoting public health, it should be found 
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Illinois Constitution. For 
an ordinance that curtails an otherwise legal occupation to be 
constitutional, it must “bear a sufficient relationship to the promotion 
of public health and safety.”152 Chicago’s mobile food vending 
Ordinance fails this standard. Since aspects of the Ordinance, and in 
particular the 200-foot rule, have little relation to the promotion of 
public health or safety, the Ordinance violates the Illinois Due Process 
Clause. 
The City’s best argument is that the Ordinance, despite possible 
flaws, should not be struck down under the permissive rational basis 
standard. For example, in Triple A Services, the Court stated “the fit 
                                                            
149 Other cities that have attempted to implement proximity restrictions on food 
trucks have failed due to public outcry and claims that the laws are arbitrary. For 
example, a bill proposed in California that would have banned food trucks from 
operating within 1,500 feet of public schools, for the purpose of promoting healthy 
eating by school children, but imposed no restrictions on fast food restaurants or 
convenience stores, was withdrawn due to public outcry. See Baylen J. Linnekin, et 
al., The New Food Truck Advocacy: Social Media, Mobile Food Vending 
Associations, Truck Lots, & Litigation in California & Beyond, 17 NEXUS: CHAP. 
J.L. & POL'Y 35, 45-46 (2011-2012). 
150 See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Lombard, 166 N.E.2d 41, 45 
(Ill. 1960). 
151 Interview with John Arena, supra note 18. 
152 Chicago Title & Trust Co., 166 N.E.2d at 44. 




between means and the end to be achieved need not be perfect” for an 
ordinance to pass the rational basis test.153 Furthermore, the Court 
held that a plaintiff must show that an ordinance is “arbitrary, 
capricious and unreasonable municipal action” to be found in 
violation of the rational basis test.154 
However, the facts concerning the 200-foot rule are distinct 
from those in Triple A Services. While one can see how increased 
congestion might affect the Chicago Medical District, there is no 
direct relationship between mobile food vendors and congestion or 
public health. Furthermore, other aspects of the Ordinance, such as 
the more extensive bans for parking near a restaurant than near a 
traffic intersection, appear to satisfy the arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable standard. Therefore, Chicago’s proximity restrictions on 
mobile food vending should be struck down. 
VI. THE TRUE IMPACT OF FOOD TRUCKS 
Regardless of whether Illinois courts find aspects of the 
Ordinance unconstitutional, current mobile food vending restrictions 
may not represent optimal policy. Supporters of food trucks claim that 
they increase consumer options for eating out,155 create a pathway to 
entrepreneurship for individuals who lack the resources to open a 
brick-and-mortar restaurant,156 and generally contribute to a city’s 
cultural fabric.157 Detractors claim that food trucks create a congestion 
nuisance and health hazard,158 and harm brick-and-mortar restaurants 
                                                            
153 Triple A Servs., Inc. v. Rice, 545 N.E.2d 706, 710 (Ill. 1989). 
154 Id. at 709 (quoting City of Decatur v. Chasteen, 166 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. 
1960)). 
155 See, e.g., Melisa Hardie et al., Auburn Food Trucks Bring Variety, 
Convenience to Campus, AUBURN U., OFFICE OF COMM. & MARKETING (Jan. 14, 
2013), http://ocm.auburn.edu/featured_story/food_trucks.html. 
156 See, e.g., NORMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 9-11.  
157 See Jonathan Gold, How America Became a Food Truck Nation: Our New 
Food Columnist Traces the Food Truck Revolution Back to its Los Angeles Roots, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 2012), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/how-
america-became-a-food-truck-nation-99979799/. 
158 See Interview with John Arena, supra note 18. 
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without paying, what some consider, their fair share in taxes.159 
Evaluating these claims is crucial in determining optimal food truck 
policy.  
While there do not seem to be any scientific surveys of food 
truck safety, there is evidence that regulated food trucks do not pose a 
significant health hazard to consumers.160 Food trucks are subject to 
many of the same inspection requirements as brick-and-mortar 
restaurants.161 Indeed, food trucks often find themselves inspected by 
health inspectors more frequently than brick-and-mortar restaurants.162 
Records from Los Angeles County show that, on average, food trucks 
are “just as clean and sanitary as restaurants.”163 Thus, there is no 
clear policy justification for restricting food trucks based on food 
safety considerations. 
Critics of mobile food vendors often assert that they increase 
vehicular and pedestrian congestion. Intuitively, it seems apparent 
that adding parked vehicles to city streets might increase local traffic. 
However, there is also evidence that suggests these congestion effects 
may be overblown. A survey conducted by the Institute for Justice 
found that having a food truck present in a crowded Washington D.C. 
neighborhood did not meaningfully impact foot traffic.164 The study 
found that adding a food truck to an area added only approximately 
100 additional pedestrians over a two-hour period.165 This increase in 
                                                            
159 See Eng, supra note 64. 
160 See Karen Cicero, Are Food Trucks Safe?, CNN (Apr. 8, 2013, 8:06 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/08/health/food-trucks-safety/. 
161 Stephanie Armour, Gourmet Food Trucks Fight Inspectors’ Perceptions, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 9, 2012, 1:05 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-09/gourmet-food-trucks-fight-
inspectors-perceptions.  
162 See Food Trucks Inspected for Safety, WBNS-10TV (July 19, 2012, 6:16 
PM), http://www.10tv.com/content/stories/2012/07/19/columbus-food-trucks-
inspected-for-safety.html.   
163 BERT GALL & LANCÉE KURCAB, SEVEN MYTHS AND REALITIES ABOUT 
FOOD TRUCKS: WHY THE FACTS SUPPORT FOOD-TRUCK FREEDOM 7 (Nov. 2012), 
available at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/vending/7-
myths-and-realities.pdf. 
164 NORMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 34. 
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pedestrians leads to a negligible one-second increase for pedestrians 
to travel a block.166 
As evidenced by the numerous restaurateurs and restaurant 
advocates who endorsed restrictive mobile food vending regulations, 
some restaurant owners believe that food trucks negatively impact 
their business and a city’s restaurants, more generally. Furthermore, 
some restaurateurs have complained the mobile food vendors have an 
unfair advantage relative to brick-and-mortar restaurants due to 
reduced costs.167 There are substantial reasons to believe this impact is 
overstated.168 Food trucks can increase the number of customers 
available to restaurants by drawing consumers to an area and by 
providing restaurants an affordable way to expand their operations.169 
Nonetheless, contemporary food trucks, which often sell restaurant-
quality fare, may sometimes overlap markets with brick-and-mortar 
establishments. 
None of the arguments advanced by the restaurateurs and 
restaurant advocates speak to the creation of good policy. Whether or 
not food trucks really do hold a competitive advantage over brick-
and-mortar restaurants should be tested in a competitive market. If 
restaurants find themselves disadvantaged because food trucks can 
either produce a superior product or offer a comparable product at a 
reduced price, market factors may drive out some restaurants. The 
meteoric rise of food trucks over the past few years,170 with the 
number of gourmet food trucks increasing over tenfold between 2009 
and 2011 in the Los Angeles area alone, suggests consumers have an 
appetite for what food trucks are selling.171 The net outcome for 
Chicago residents of more food trucks will be expanded access to 
culinary options at a reduced price. 
Furthermore, proponents of tightened regulations on mobile 
food vendors often argue that brick-and-mortar restaurants, which are 
                                                            
166 Id. 
167 See GALL & KURCAB, supra note 163, at 5. 
168 Id. at 8. 
169 Id. 
170 See Linnekin et al., supra note 149, at 40. 
171 Id. at 38. 
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subject to property taxes, create more tax revenues for cities, and thus 
deserve preferential treatment over mobile food vendors.172 While 
food trucks do pay some taxes, including sales tax, they lack 
storefronts and thus do not pay property tax.173 
To determine whether food trucks decrease a city’s total tax 
income, one must determine to what extent food trucks siphon off 
customers that would have patronized restaurants, thus harming the 
restaurant industry and reducing tax receipts, and to what extent this 
decrease in restaurant revenue and tax payments is offset by sales 
taxes paid by food trucks. To date, no comprehensive study has been 
conducted on this topic. 
If policy makers conclude that food trucks do decrease city tax 
revenues, there are less intrusive ways to decrease this impact than 
spatial limitations. One possible solution is to change the taxes 
imposed on restaurants.174 Another is to permit mobile food vendors 
to operate throughout the City but to impose a mobile food vendor 
tax. For example, during the City’s Taste of Chicago festival mobile 
food vendors are charged a 25% tax rate on revenue, whereas pop-up 
restaurants are charged 20% to account for increase costs restaurants 
have to participate in the event.175 While it would have a negative 
impact on the growth of the Chicago food truck industry, the 
imposition of such taxes would create a better competitive 
environment than an outright ban.176  
                                                            
172 E.g., Eng, supra note 64. 
173 See Beth Kregor, Five Ways to Give Chicagoans the Food Trucks They 
Deserve, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (May 15, 2012), 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20120515/NEWS07/120519897/five-ways-
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175 Alex Levine, Emanuel Swings and Misses: Taste of Chicago & Food Trucks, 
FOOD TRUCK FREAK (Apr. 29, 2013), http://foodtruckfreak.com/emanuel-swings-
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Pigovian taxes, are market preferable to outright bans or limits is well-established in 
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See, e.g., Nathan Sadeghi-Nejad, NYC’s Soda Ban is a Good Idea, but a Tax Would 
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In addition, the Ordinance also increases incentives for business 
owners to operate outside the confines of the law. Burdensome 
regulation can lead to a black market in which a city could not 
monitor health and safety conditions.177  Goods sold on a black market 
are those that cannot be exchanged legally or which are exchanged in 
a way contrary to the laws or regulations of the country where they 
are sold.178 Major causes for black markets include the prohibition of 
goods and high tax levels.179 Furthermore, government imposed 
licensing requirements “cause some workers to enter the black market 
because they don’t want or can’t afford to invest the time and money 
to obtain required licenses.”180  
While statistics on illicit mobile food vending in the City of 
Chicago are limited, certain entrepreneurs do engage in mobile food 
vending outside the confines of the law. Many Chicago pushcarts, 
including Mexican food and elote carts, are operated without a 
license.181 Many of these non-licensed mobile food businesses appear 
to be tacitly tolerated.182 Easing restrictions on mobile food vending 
would decrease illicit mobile food vending and bring more of 
Chicago’s vendors under the City’s oversight.183  
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181 See Claire Bushey, Legalize It: City Pushcart Vendors Could Legally 
Prepare Food with a Type of License that Already Exists in the Parks. Why Not Let 
Them?, READER (May 28, 2009), http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/legalize-
it/Content?oid=1141442. 
182 Id. 
183 The proposition that over-regulation will lead to an underground economy is 
widely supported. See, e.g., Underground Economy, ENCYCLOPEDIA CHI., 
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/1280.html (last visited Nov. 6, 
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(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3866, 2006), available at 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-3866; Martha Alter Chen, 
Vol. 10.2]   Elan Shpigel 
 
 386 
VII. WHAT CAN THE CITY DO TO IMPROVE ITS POLICY? 
 As analyzed above, neither public health nor congestion 
concerns validate the Ordinance as representing good mobile food 
vending policy. Furthermore, while the ongoing case of Burke v. 
Chicago represents a strong challenge to Chicago’s mobile food 
Ordinance, it is unclear if the court will find in favor of the plaintiffs. 
Chicago would be best served by reforming its mobile food vending 
Ordinance to promote the safe operation of mobile food vendors 
throughout the City. 
Removing the 200-foot rule in its entirety would serve the 
City’s best interests. There is simply no rational relationship between 
proximity to a brick-and-mortar restaurant and preventing congestion 
or protecting public health. Maintaining public health would be best 
served by maintaining food truck regulations related to food safety 
and vehicle specifications, as well as maintaining public health 
inspections of mobile food vendors.184  
If the City is concerned that mobile food vending will 
exacerbate congestion in areas such as the Loop, there are steps it can 
take to alleviate this traffic. One option is to prohibit the operation of 
mobile vendors on certain streets, or at certain times, when congestion 
is particularly problematic. A more elegant and efficient solution is to 
implement a congestion tax for mobile vendors in high traffic areas or 
during high congestion times. Such a tax could operate by charging 
mobile food vendors a substantial fixed fee for the right to operate in 
highly congested parts of the City. Such a tax would incentivize only 
                                                                                                                                           
Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy and the 
Formal Regulatory Environment (United Nations Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, 
Working Paper No. 46, 2007), available at 
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184 It is important to remember that a policy change alone will not necessarily 
lead to improved outcomes. For example, six months after Chicago changed its laws 
to allow onboard cooking for mobile food vendors, not a single Chicago vendor had 
been permitted to do so. See Monica Eng, Nothing’s Cooking on Chicago Food 
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vendors with high sales expectations to operate in areas of the City 
with high congestion.  
As analyzed above, the City’s mobile food vending laws were 
largely a product of lobbying and pressure applied to local aldermen. 
While there are limits to what restrictions the City can place on 
lobbying, there are other issues concerning aldermen participation in 
the licensing of food trucks that lead to concern. Aldermen are highly 
invested in the process of approving small businesses, including 
mobile food vendors.185 Removing aldermanic discretion from 
licensing and permitting processes might defang lobbyists wishing to 
slow the growth of the mobile food industry.186  
CONCLUSION 
Chicago regulates mobile food vendors in a myriad of ways. 
Some mobile food vending ordinances, and in particular the 200-foot 
rule, represent a major barrier to the operation of mobile food vendors 
in the City. Removing the barrier would increase consumer access to 
different food choices and empower entrepreneurs to create new 
businesses, as well as reduce the incentive to operate in a black-
market business.  
Ordinance 02012-4489 does not appear to be related to the state 
policy goals of reducing congestion or protecting public health. 
Additionally, many aspects of the Ordinance, as well as statements 
made by its defenders, suggest the true purpose of mobile food 
vending restrictions is the protection of brick and mortar restaurants. 
The lack of a rational relationship between policy objectives and the 
                                                            
185 See ELIZABETH MILNIKEL & EMILY SATTERTHWAITE, INST. FOR JUSTICE, 
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Ordinance suggests that it should be found in violation of the Illinois 
Constitution. The motion filed by plaintiffs Schnitzel King and 
Cupcakes for Courage in Burke represents an excellent opportunity 
for Illinois courts to strike down the Ordinance. 
Chicago’s mobile food vending laws are substantially more 
stringent than those in other American cities. Furthermore, legitimate 
City interests such as public health and reducing congestion can be 
furthered through less restrictive means than current restrictions, and, 
empirical evidence contradicts critiques of food trucks. Ultimately, 
Chicago stands to accrue significant benefits by amending its mobile 
food vending laws. 
